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Introduction 
The Lisbon Treaty is a monumental step toward fully integrating European Union (EU) military 
capabilities within its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). An underlying concern 
resulting from the treaty is the amount of  redundancy it creates with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). NATO and the EU had already developed redundancies in military 
capabilities. To some extent, this duplication is healthy and necessary to allow Europeans to further 
develop their military capabilities. On the political level, the line between healthy and unhealthy 
redundancy can be thin. This is particularly true when one organization attempts to take on the role 
of  the other creating competition rather than cooperation.1 The purpose of  this paper is to 
determine the extent the Lisbon Treaty actually promotes a complementary relationship between 
NATO and the EU in the field of  Security and Defense Policy. 
After providing a brief  historical background, the investigation begins with a review of  NATO‘s 
relationship with the EU and its CSDP and the existing cooperation between both organizations. 
This sets the stage for the subsequent assessment of  the Lisbon Treaty within the framework of  
NATO-EU relations. In this part, the analysis briefly assesses the decisions implemented by the 
Lisbon Treaty in relationship to the major changes it creates within the CSDP. Then, the analysis 
focuses on the implications of  these changes for the NATO-EU relationship. This includes the 
impact on the strategic orientation of  CSDP, the effects of  the Lisbon Treaty‘s changes on the EU‘s 




The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NATO has been the cornerstone for European security for more than sixty years and remains a vital 
component of  the global security framework for both the United States (US) and European 
members.2 Since its foundation in 1949, critics often inaccurately portrayed the organization‘s 
condition and calculated the Alliance‘s death in view of  its record of  perpetual internal political 
conflict, epitomized by such events as the Suez crisis of  1956, the French withdrawal from NATO‘s 
integrated military command in 1966, or the stationing of  Pershing II missiles in Europe in the early 
                                                 
1 The reviewed literature shows that in international relations ―competition‖ is predominantly used in a negative sense of  
―rivalries‖ and opposing interests. The paper will follow this definition. 
 
2 NATO, Letter from President Obama (January 20, 2009), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2009/s090120a.html 
(accessed April 26, 2011). 
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1980s. However, the Alliance has repeatedly proven its ability to overcome internal crisis and 
diplomatic strategic challenges by successful dispute resolution and effective adaptation.3  
From a historical perspective, the Yugoslavia Wars in the Balkans caused the Alliance to transform 
into an active provider of  security outside its territories for crisis management. Member states 
agreed on a new Strategic Concept in 1999, which defined wider security risks for NATO and 
shifted the focus of  the organization to more global security matters.4 In order to meet new threats 
where they occur, it became necessary to transform NATO member‘s large and conventionally 
focused units into agile and deployable expeditionary forces. Thus, member state political leaders 
endorsed the Defense Capabilities Initiative during the Washington Summit in 1999 to ―ensure the 
effectiveness of  future multinational operations across the full spectrum of  Alliance missions in the 
present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability 
among Alliance forces.‖5 Promoting security and stability in Europe, the Alliance also reached out to 
the east: Poland, Bulgaria, and Albania – among other countries – joined NATO in 1999, 2004, and 
2009. With this, NATO doubled the number of  its members in barely ten years. 
Two years later, the appearance of  international terrorism posed a new threat for the Alliance. In the 
wake of  the 9/11 attacks, when NATO invoked collective defense under Article 5 for the first time 
in its history, the member states showed their willingness to adapt to new threats but also revealed 
that they had not yet transformed their forces sufficiently to close the gap between US and 
European military capabilities. Consequently, the Alliance refined the Defense Capabilities Initiative 
during the 2002 Prague Summit and agreed to improve military capabilities in eight specified areas 
under the Prague Capability Commitment.6 The Prague Summit also introduced the NATO 
Response Force. This high readiness force should serve as a catalyst for focusing and promoting 
improvements in these areas and should equip the Alliance with a high quality, self-sustainable, 
expeditionary capability to respond to any crisis within thirty days. The transformation process 
initiated in Prague 2002 is ongoing. NATO remains heavily dependent on United States‘ forces and 
capabilities today and European countries have not yet aligned their efforts and resources within the 
Alliance sufficiently.7 Besides the ongoing transformation process in NATO, twenty-two of  NATO‘s 
twenty-eight members have also pushed forward their integration in security and defense within the 
European Union in an equally dynamic, comprehensive, and politically transformational way. 
                                                 
3 NATO is also often referred to as the ―Alliance‖. Both terms will be used synonymously in this article. Ryan C. 
Hendrickson, "The Miscalculation of  NATO's Death," Parameter (Spring 2007): 101-104, 112. See also Lawrence S. 
Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United - The Evolution of  an Alliance (London: Praeger, 2004), 13, 31-34, 91-94.  
 
4 NATO, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (April 24, 1999), 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed April 26, 2011). 
 
5 NATO, Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) Overview (December 1999), http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/9912-
hq/fs-dci99.htm (accessed April 26, 2011). 
 
6 NATO, Prague Summit Declaration (Brussels, 21 November 2002): 1, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm 
(accessed 20 April 2010). 
 
7 Sally McNamara, NATO Summit 2010: Time to Turn Words into Action (Backgrounder No. 2498, Washington D.C.: 
Heritage Foundation, 2010), 8. Carl W. Ek, NATO's Prague Capability Commitment, CRS Report for Congress (Washington 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 1-6. NATO, Comprehensive Political Guidance (Brussels, 29 November 2009), 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b061129e.htm (accessed 5 September 2010). Mats Berdal, and David Ucko, "NATO 
at 60," Survival (Mai 2009): 60. 
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 European Integration in Security and Defense 
During the Cold War, the primary focus of  European integration lay on economic integration and 
economic cooperation through a common European market within the European Communities. In 
1992, the Treaty of  Maastricht merged these Communities into the European Union and expanded 
the level of  cooperation among the members including a Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Given the ongoing NATO transformation process triggered by the Balkan Wars, the EU also chose 
to rethink its approach towards crisis management. This led to revived interest in the idea of  a 
European Common Defense concept.8 
NATO‘s intervention in Bosnia revealed a huge imbalance between European and US military 
capabilities and led to the creation of  a European pillar within the NATO framework, known as the 
European Security Defense Initiative. This approach, favored by US President Clinton‘s 
administration, implied that any political decision on European defense cooperation would always 
require de facto US approval. The initially hesitant US attitude towards an engagement in the 
Kosovo conflict in 1998 again demonstrated the inability of  European countries to provide security 
in Europe and convinced European powers to create a European Defense within the EU rather than 
within NATO.9 Consequently, the British-Franco Saint Malo initiative of  1998 proposed that the EU 
should handle Europe‘s joint defense and that European countries should correct imbalances in 
Euro-American security cooperation. The initiative is often referred to as the ―birth certificate‖ of  
the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).10 This development raised serious questions 
among non-EU NATO members, particularly because of  fears that CSDP would duplicate NATO 
assets, discriminate against non-EU NATO members, and decouple the United States from Europe. 
Hence, the Prime Minister of  the United Kingdom (UK), Tony Blair, reaffirmed CSDP‘s limitation 
to peacekeeping missions, particularly ―where NATO as a whole chooses not to be engaged.‖11 With 
                                                 
8 The forming of  the Western European Union was the ―first attempt at a common European defense alliance.‖ 
However, the organization was soon marginalized due to the founding of  NATO. The Western European Union 
nevertheless existed until 30 June 2011. The second attempt to integrate in the field of  security and defense was the 
French proposal of  a European Defense Community. The treaty failed to come into effect in 1954, mainly because of   
France‘s fears that such an agreement would threaten its national sovereignty. Margarita Mathiopoulos and István 
Gyarmati, ―Saint Malo and Beyond–Toward European Defense,‖ Washington Quarterly 22, no. 4 (Autumn 1999): 65. 
GlobalSecurity.org, European Defence Community (EDC) (July 09, 2011), 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/edc.htm (accessed August 17, 2011). 
 
9 The Kosovo conflict was one major contributing factor to the British shift in attitude towards European Defense 
within the EU rather than the European Security Defense Initiative within NATO (the St. Malo initiative), particularly if  
the US does not want to be engaged. Europa, European Security Defense Identity (2010), 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/european_security_defence_identity_en.htm (accessed April 26, 2011). 
Mathiopoulos and Gyarmati, 66, 68. 
 
10 The EU officially introduced CSDP – originally referred to as European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) – during 
the EU summit in Cologne in June 1999. Asle Toje, The EU, NATO and European Defence–A Slow Train Coming 
(Occasional Paper, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2008), 11. LTC (GS) Peter Fischer, European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) After Ten years—Current Situation and Perspectives (Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
School of  Advanced Military Studies, 2010), 7. 
 
11 Secretary of  State Madeleine Albright spelled out the US concerns and the US policy towards CSDP using the ―three 
Ds‖ and Donald Rumsfeld repeated this warning addressing the Munich Conference on Security in 2001, expressing US 
policy-makers‘ and defense experts‘ skepticism regarding the value of  CSDP. Fischer, 13. Kori Schake, Constructive 
Duplication: Reducing EU Reliance on US Military Assets (Working Paper, London: Center For European Reform, 2002), 5. 
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these peacekeeping missions, Blair referred to the Petersberg Tasks that the EU had already adopted 
in 1997. The Union later extended these tasks to include joint disarmament operations, military 
advice and assistance, conflict prevention, and post-conflict stabilization.12 To fulfill the Petersberg 
Tasks, the member states of  the EU needed to transform their militaries and to gain access to the 
military planning capabilities and forces of  NATO to avoid unnecessary duplications. To meet these 
two requirements, the EU adopted the Helsinki Headline Goal of  1999 and the ―Berlin Plus‖ 
agreements in 2002.13 The Helsinki Headline Goal, later transferred into the Headline Goal 2010, set 
out a general capability requirement with the objective to hold a corps size force of  50,000-60,000 
deployable within 60 days with the ability to sustain them for at least one year. Subsequent analysis 
identified five key shortfalls in European military capabilities: strategic and tactical airlift; 
sustainability and logistics (including air-to-air refueling); effective engagement technologies 
including precision weapons; rescue helicopters; and Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance systems.14 
The rapid development potential within CSDP motivated EU member states to create an EU 
Security Strategy for cooperative defense.  This set for the first time a policy framework for CSDP, 
which led to the adoption of  the Headline Goal 2010, and introduced the European Battle Group 
concept.15 This should enable the EU to contribute more visibly to external security and to 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
12 Initially, the Ministerial Council of  the Western European Union introduced the Petersberg Tasks in June 1992, which 
comprised humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping missions, and tasks for combat forces in crisis management 
(including peacemaking). The EU adopted these tasks from the Western European Union by the Treaty of  Amsterdam 
of  1997, amending the Maastricht Treaty. The extension of  the Petersberg Tasks goes back to a report of  Michael 
Barnier, who suggested creating a European Civil Protection Force in 2002. Assembly of  Western European Union, 
"Security and Defence Aspects of  the Lisbon Reform Treaty," Europa Varietas Institute (January 31, 2008): 2-3, 
http://europavarietas.visuart.eu/files/combarieulisbonneen.pdf  (accessed April 30, 2011). Julian Heß, Das Verhältnis von 
NATO und EU–Eine Analyse unter Berücksichtigung des Lissabonner Reformvertrages (Munich: AVM-Verlag, 2009), 4. Martin 
Reichard, The EU-NATO Relationship–A Legal and Political Perspective (UK, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), 73. European 
Union, Consolidated Version of  the Treaty on European Union, (May 09, 2008), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF (accessed April 30, 2011). 
 
13 Berlin Plus has its roots in the ―Berlin Agreement‖ that allowed European countries already limited access to NATO 
planning capabilities as part of  the European Security Defense Initiative. NATO, Final Communiqué (June 03, 1996), 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm (accessed April 30, 2011). Javier Solana, "Remarks by Javier Solana, 
EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy following the agreement on the establishment of  
EU-NATO permanent arrangements," Consilium (December 16, 2002), 1, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/73803%20-%20Solana%20-
%20Permanent%20arrangements%20+%20NATO%20declaration.pdf  (accessed April 30, 2011). 
 
14 European Council, "Annex IV of  the Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council," Consilium (December 10-
11, 1999): 5, 9-11, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki%20European%20Council%20-
%20Annex%20IV%20of%20the%20Presidency%20Conclusions.pdf  (accessed April 30, 2011). European Parliament, 
"The European Security and Defence Policy: from the Helsinki Headline Goal to the EU Battlegroups," The European 
Parliament (September 12, 2006): 4, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede030909noteesdp_/sede030909noteesd
p_en.pdf  (accessed April 30, 2011). European Union, "The EU Battlegroups and the EU Civilian and Military Cell," 
Consilium (February 2005): 1, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Battlegroups.pdf  (accessed April 30, 
2011). 
 
15 A Battle Group is a combined arms battalion of  approximately 1,500 troops; reinforced with combat support 
elements, and associated with a Force Headquarters as well as pre-identified transport and logistics elements; deployable 
within fifteen days; and sustainable for 120 days. Ibid., European Council, "Headline Goal 2010," Consilium (June 17-18, 
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transform European forces more rapidly. To avoid duplicating NATO‘s command structure, the 
member states of  Alliance and the EU also agreed on the Berlin Plus agreement, which granted the 
EU access to military planning capabilities and enabled the EU to lead military missions.16 With 
regard to the EU‘s goal of  more effective crisis management, CSDP also needed to include civilian 
capabilities and effective structures to lead operations following a comprehensive approach. From 
May 2000, the EU thus started to create the structures to plan and coordinate civilian crisis 
management and to deploy civilian capabilities of  its members.17 The last step in European 
integration marked the Lisbon Treaty, established in December 2009. Its impact on CSDP made the 
three-pillar model obsolete, which has described the functioning of  the EU until 2009.18 The 
significant progress in CSDP and the ongoing transformation in NATO increased the need to 
improve the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty in Light of  NATO-EU Relations 
NATO and the EU are founded on common values and strategic interests, particularly in the fields 
of  security, defense, and crisis management. NATO and the EU‘s cooperation are primarily directed 
at supporting the fight against terrorism, strengthening the development of  coherent and mutually 
reinforcing military capabilities, and cooperating in the field of  civil emergency planning. From a 
NATO perspective, there is no doubt that a ―stronger EU will further contribute to our common 
security.‖19 NATO strives for improvements in the strategic partnership with the EU, which can be 
summarized by the following four premises: closer cooperation, higher transparency, greater 
efficiency, and continual autonomy.20 To achieve a closer cooperation and higher transparency, 
                                                                                                                                                             
2004): 3, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf  (accessed April 30, 
2011). 
 
16 The agreement of  2002 determined the EU-NATO framework for permanent relations. Operation Althea in Bosnia 
Herzegovina was the first mission in which the EU accessed NATO command structures under Berlin Plus. Before the 
EU could take over the mission from NATO, the member states had to agree on the terms, which proved to be difficult 
due to the Turkish-Greek conflict on Cyprus. This dispute resulted in three years of  difficulty negotiations before Berlin 
Plus became eventually effective on 17 March 2003. Solana, 1. Council of  the European Union. "Presidency 
Conclusions," Institute of  European Integration and Policy, (October 24-25, 2002), 17, http://eeep.pspa.uoa.gr/cn-
Brussels%20Octob%202002.pdf  (accessed April 30, 2011). Reichard, 284, 286, 287. 
 
17 Andreas Winter, ―The Lisbon Treaty and its Implications for the CSDP in the Light of  the Emerging Strategic 
Partnership Between NATO and the EU‖ (Master‘s Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff  
College, 2010), 38-43. Manfred Lange, ―Militärische Aspekte der ESVP aus der Perspektive des deutschen EU-
Vorsitzes,‖ Militärische Aspekte der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik im Lichte der EU-Ratspräsidentschaft (Michael 
Staack (ed.), WIFIS No 26, 2008), 20.  
 
18 From 1992 until 2009, the ―three pillar model‖ explained best the functioning of  the EU. Supranational treaties (the 
original European Communities) characterized the first and strongest pillar. The second and third pillars represented the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Justice and Home Affairs (transferred into Police and Judicial Co-
operation on Criminal Matters by the Treaty of  Amsterdam in 1997). 
 
19 NATO, Riga Summit Declaration (Brussels, 29 November 2006): paragraph 41, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm (accessed 5 September 2010). 
 
20 Ibid. NATO, Bucharest Summit Declaration (Brussels, 3 April 2008): paragraph 14, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm (accessed 18 September 2010). NATO, Strasbourg/Kehl 
Summit Declaration, (Brussels, 4 April 2009): paragraph 20, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease (accessed 9 August 2010). 
Strategic Insights • Winter 2011 Volume 10, Issue 3 71
NATO took various initiatives within the NATO-EU Capability Group—a forum established in 
2003 to allow formal coordination between both organizations besides the existing informal NATO-
EU staff-to-staff  dialogue.21 To achieve greater efficiency in NATO operations, the Alliance also 
agreed to integrate civilian public service planners (e.g., police) into the planning and conduct of  
military operations, following the idea of  a ―comprehensive approach‖ for conflict resolution. 
Considering the scarce resources of  its members, NATO cannot afford to develop its own civilian 
capabilities and thus relies on cooperation in this field with other organizations, namely the EU.22 
Avoiding unnecessary duplications would also allow greater efficiency to get more (capabilities) out 
of  less (resources). Particularly, NATO encourages nations to re-prioritize financial resources, 
―including through pooling and other forms of  bilateral or multilateral cooperation.‖23 However, 
two major political obstacles prevent closer cooperation, higher transparency, and greater efficiency 
between NATO and the EU. First, France and the UK differ substantially in their political end state 
of  CSDP and the question of  how to progressively carry forward European integration in the 
defense sector. Second, the Greece-Turkey conflict over Cyprus blocks effective cooperation within 
the NATO-EU Capability Group. The missing  security agreement between the EU and NATO 
allows Turkey to block cooperation with Cyprus. In return, Cyprus and Greece oppose Turkey 
having closer relationships with the EU, particularly through administrative arrangements with the 
European Defense Agency (EDA), which hinders effective cooperation between NATO and the 
EDA. Those political obstacles have a huge impact on NATO who is struggling to define how the 
Alliance wants to achieve an effective strategic partnership with the EU, how to achieve greater 
transparency in its relations with the EU, and how CSDP could effectively contribute to NATO‘s 
missions and vice versa. Particularly, this materializes in sharing information and intelligence in such 
missions, the development and employment of  military and civilian capabilities, and the overcoming 
of  the highly fragmentized European industrial defense market, which is a major factor in military 
capability shortfalls of  European countries.24 
The Lisbon Treaty and CSDP 
The effect of  the Lisbon Treaty on the EU, and in particular, on the Union‘s CSDP is considerable. 
The changes concern three areas: the strategic goal and orientation of  CSDP, the modification of  
institutional structures responsible for carrying out CSDP, and the procedures for future capability 
development under the head of  EDA.25 The modified strategic goal for CSDP is a continuation of  
the provisions of  the European Security Strategy, which aimed at strengthening ―mutual solidarity of 
the EU [to make the EU] a more credible and effective actor.‖26 This will eventually lead to a 
common defense and solidarity among EU member states in case of an armed attack, a natural 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
21 Paul Sturm, ―NATO and the EU: Cooperation?‖ European Security Review No. 48 (February 2010): 1, http://www.isis-
europe.org/pdf/2010_artrel_445_eu-nato-capabilities.pdf  (accessed 20 September 2010). 
 
22 NATO, Comprehensive Political Guidance, paragraph 7e. 
 
23 Ibid., paragraph 15. 
 
24 Winter, 55, 61-62, 90-91. 
 
25 For a more detailed assessment of  the changes of  the Lisbon Treaty: Winter, 62-73. European Union, Treaty of  
Lisbon–Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Brussels, 3 December 
2007), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00014.en07.pdf  (accessed 20 September 2010). 
26 European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World–European Security Strategy (Brussels, 12 December 2003): 1, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf  (accessed 11 September 2010). 
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disaster, or a man-made accident. Additionally, the EU also adopted the extended Petersberg Tasks 
for CSDP from the Western European Union, which now include ―joint disarmament operations, 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-
keeping tasks, tasks of  combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-
conflict stabilization.‖27 
The major changes to the institutional structures and main decision making bodies responsible for 
implementing CSDP impact various areas. First, the Treaty establishes the European Council as an 
official institution, which is now chaired by a long term and full-time President in contrast to the 
former six month rotation cycle of  the Presidency. Second, the treaty adapted the office of  the High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (HR) and, third, establishes the European 
External Action Service as a diplomatic service of  the EU.28 With this step, the EU merges two 
former areas of  EU foreign relations and takes the next step towards more coherent and consistent 
external relations. The bureau of  the HR is in fact a new and independent office, which now 
coordinates and conducts CSDP as a link between the Council of  the EU.  The European 
Commission now also serves as head of  the European External Action Service, and as president of  
the EDA. Lastly, the EU integrates EU civilian and crisis management structures at the strategic 
planning level introducing the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD).29 The 
directorate will streamline existing structures responsible for civilian crisis management, will unify 
civilian and military planning at the strategic level as integral part of  EEAS, and will serve as the 
highest institution of  civilian crisis management planning within the EU.30 
The treaty also officially introduces Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defense (PSCD) as a tool 
to foster the military capacity of  its member states and to harmonize, pool, and specialize military 
needs, means and capabilities – including higher cooperation in the fields of  training and logistics, 
particularly through EDA. The Lisbon Treaty elevated the EDA from Joint Action to Treaty level, 
which provides a much firmer legal base to work from and clarifies existing practices in armament 
cooperation. EDA is now an official part of  CSDP and–under the direction of  the HR–identifies 
                                                 
27 After the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, the Western European Union treaty was terminated in 2010 and the 
organization ceased to exist on 30 June 2011. The extended Petersberg Tasks can be executed within the Union 
framework only by a group of  member states, ―which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task.‖ 
Western European Union, Western European Union (Brussels, 27 May 2011), http://www.weu.int/ (accessed 28 November 
2011). European Union, Treaty of  Lisbon–Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (Brussels, 3 December 2007): 47, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00014.en07.pdf  
(accessed 20 September 2010). 
 
28 The EU also renamed the post to ―High Representative of  the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.‖ 
 
29 Although not introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, CMPD is very important for gaining a better understanding of  the 
Treaty‘s impact adapting its institutional level. European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, Statement on Civilian-Military 
Integration in European Security and Defence Policy (Brussels, 6 January 2009): 8, and 14, 
http://www.eplo.org/documents/EPLO_Statement.pdf  (accessed 21 June 2010). 
 
30 Carmen Gebhard, ―The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate: Recalibrating ESDP Planning and Conduct 
Capacities,‖ CFSP Forum Vol. 7, No. 4 (Vienna, Institute for Advanced Studies, July 2009): 8, 
http://carmengebhard.com/CFSP_Forum_vol_7_no_4_Gebhard.pdf  (accessed 3 July 2010). 
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operational requirements and implements any measures needed to strengthen a competitive 
European defense market and a strong European industrial base.31 
 
The Lisbon Treaty and its Effects on the NATO-EU Relationship 
The Lisbon Treaty constitutes a very important juncture for CSDP and its strategic orientation, even 
though the Treaty does not resolve the Union‘s lack of  strategic culture. First, by unifying the EC 
and the EU, the EU undoubtedly assumes a single legal personality, which strengthens the 
organization‘s position in negotiating international agreements (the treaty making power) using its 
entire means. It also allows the Union to establish bilateral diplomatic relations with international 
actors, by speaking and acting as one body. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty provides a possible end 
state for CSDP (mutual defense), amends its spectrum of  future missions (the extended Petersberg 
Tasks), and specifies its strategic vision of  a ―more active, more coherent, and more capable‖ 
Union.32 
Despite these important strategic effects on the EU, it is equally important to address remaining 
shortcomings in European strategy development. The EU has not initiated a continuous progression 
in its strategic thinking, even though it is already demanded by the EU Security Strategy and 
suggested by a variety of  international scholars. The absence of  corresponding objectives for the 
Union‘s political, diplomatic, military, civilian, and trade and development activities actually fosters 
internal disputes and internal division about strategic objectives and priorities, which leads to EU 
actions that appear unpredictable and weak to external actors.33 However, the Lisbon Treaty as a 
next step towards higher integration in the European defense sector would address all of  the 
shortfalls in European strategic development.34 
 
Mutual Defense and the Solidarity Clause 
At first glance, the intent of  mutual defense duplicates NATO‘s role of  providing a common 
defense of  member states. This would be contradictory to achieving a complementary relationship 
and probably promote competition between both organizations. However, for the EU to act as 
                                                 
31 Jean-Pierre Darnis et. Al., Lessons Learned from European Defence Equipment Programmes, Occasional Paper (Paris: 
European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2007), 18. Ibid., 89. European Union, Treaty of  Lisbon–Amending the Treaty 
on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 46. 
 
32 European Union, Treaty of  Lisbon–Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, 11. Klaus Olshausen, ―Zehn Jahre Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik,‖ Der Mittler-Brief 24. Jg 
(Herford, 2009), 5-6. Lange, 17. Sven Biscop, ―A ‗European Army‘ for the EU and NATO?‖ Egmont Paper (Brussels: 
Egmont–Royal Institute for International Relations, 3 March 2007), 12. Winter, 73-74. 
 
33 Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont. ―A Strategy for CSDP–Europe‘s Ambitions as a Global Security Provider,‖ Egmont 
Paper No. 37 (Brussels: Egmont–Royal Institute for International Relations, October 2010): 8, 
http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep37.pdf, (accessed 11 October 2010). Biscop, ―A ‗European Army‘ for the 
EU and NATO?‖ 12. 
 
34 The ―bottom-up approach‖ is an important characteristic of  the EU‘s external policies. Usually, (a group of) individual 
states take the initiative to create something new and/or to build up their involvement in CSDP, rather than following a 
supranational decision to become involved. A good example is the creation of  the European Security Strategy, which 
was provided in 2003, after European countries had already started building capabilities under CSDP five years earlier. 
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another provider of  collective defense is questionable for two reasons. First, the Lisbon Treaty 
explicitly defines NATO‘s primacy in this regard. The Treaty clearly states that the EU respects ―the 
obligations of  certain Member States, which see their common defence realized in [NATO]‖ and 
that its policy will ―be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within 
that framework.‖ 35 Second, the EU‘s six neutral Member States do not indicate any intent to change 
their distinct national defense policies of  not participating in a CSDP.  In practice, this means that 
the EU will not be able to organize its military forces for a territorial defense. Given NATO‘s and 
the EU‘s similar threat assessment, such an attempt would also be unnecessary and redundant. 
However, the solidarity clause might have important legal implications for the Union, for instance, in 
case of  a terrorist attack. Meeting such threats remains vital for the EU, especially in conjunction 
with proliferation of  weapons of  mass destruction. Mutual defense may allow the EU to use military 
force internally to meet such threats and their consequences, including natural disasters, man-made 
accidents, or collapses of  supply networks and communications. The mutual defense clause may also 
help to overcome the wide array of  national caveats on the use of  military forces inside the EU, and 
signals that solely nationalistic approaches in defense planning of  its members are no longer 
feasible.36 
In light of  these reasons, the mutual defense clause is not directed to duplicate NATO‘s role and will 
certainly not promote competition between NATO and the EU. The legal and secondary 
implications of  the clause could actually encourage EU Member States to focus on streamlining 
capability planning under the head of  the EU. As long as this is in line with NATO capability 
planning, this could have positive effects for the Alliance as well. In this sense, the mutual defense 
clause could even promote a complementary partnership between both organizations, if  the EU 
does not decide to decouple military defense planning from NATO‘s procedures and if  the 
organization translates the political goal of  common defense in operational terms. This emphasizes 
the need for NATO and the EU to strengthen cooperation through regular consultation, highlights 
that political consensus within the EU is required to shape CSDP more progressively in the future, 
and raises the question of  how cooperation with NATO should be institutionalized.37 
 
The Extended Petersberg Tasks 
In adopting the extended Petersberg Tasks for CSDP, the EU partly took over tasks, such as 
providing military advice, military assistance, and conflict prevention. Since 1994, these tasks were 
already fulfilled by NATO‘s Partnership for Peace program. This creates an overlap in tasks between 
NATO and the EU, but does not necessarily lead to competition between both organizations. The 
credo of  Berlin Plus – to launch EU-led operations only ―where NATO as a whole is not engaged‖– 
still determines whether the EU can actually fulfill these tasks. 38 EU-led operations such as 
                                                 
35 European Union, Consolidated Version of  the Treaty on European Union, 26. 
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CONCORDIA in Macedonia (completed on 15 December 2003) and EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia 
(still ongoing) have shown that the agreement can be successfully achieved, enabling the EU to act. 
In both operations, NATO‘s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe acted as Operational 
Commander for the EU and the Union launched its missions following a terminated NATO mission 
(e.g., ALLIED HARMONY and SFOR).39 In contrast, the duplication of  tasks can also lead to 
negative examples, such as, the ―beauty contest‖ between NATO and the EU over West Sudan. Both 
organizations were divided due to a US-French argument about the question of  whether NATO or 
the EU was supposed to lead management of  the crisis. Another example is Operation ARTEMIS, 
launched in 2003 to stabilize conflict areas in the Democratic Republic of  Congo. The EU was able 
to deploy military forces without NATO support utilizing Berlin Plus. This was an important 
accomplishment for the EU, but simultaneously raised annoyance among some NATO Members 
because of  the EU's lack of  consultation with the Alliance.40 
Adopting the extended Petersberg Tasks neither promotes a complementary relationship between 
both organizations nor does it increase competition. Like the mutual defense clause, the actual 
utilization of  a task and its perception will depend upon communication and consultation between 
NATO and the EU. This underlines how important it is for NATO and the EU to agree upon a 
standard protocol in this regard and to institutionalize their cooperation. 
 
Adapted Institutions and their Effects for a Strategic Partnership 
The officially introduced European Council, the widely adapted tasks and responsibilities of  the HR, 
and the newly introduced EEAS are remarkable amendments in the EU‘s institutional framing and 
exercising of  CSDP. With the introduction of  CMPD and the streamlining of  its civilian crisis 
management institutions, these changes will have significant effects for the future of  the EU and its 
relations with NATO. 
 
The European Council as a Intergovernmental Institution 
Officially introducing the European Council and its new presidency as the main body responsible 
for developing general guidelines and strategic lines for CSDP strengthens the intergovernmental 
character of  CSDP.41 The Lisbon Treaty underlines that the principle of  unanimity as a cornerstone 
of  security and defense cooperation in the EU will remain, although qualified majority voting applies 
for some areas of  CSDP. This has positive and negative aspects for CSDP. On the one hand, 
decisions that require consensus among the EU‘s members send a strong and firm internal and 
external message demonstrating the EU‘s determination to act. On the other hand, unanimity gives 
member states the power to block decisions that a vast majority might want to take. This hampers 
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the EU in carrying out CSDP more progressively.42 There is, nevertheless, a good chance that 
political issues between the Member States could be mitigated through the HR, the EEAS, and the 
EDA and that CSDP will be more capable in the future.43 However, progress in this field will 
continue to be slow and will remain dependent on bottom-up initiatives. 
Inter-governmentalism for CSDP neither fosters nor hampers a complementary relationship 
between NATO and the EU. Nevertheless, there are risks that existing political issues between EU 
Members as well as between EU and non-EU Members may become institutionalized, which will 
prevent a strategic partnership. On the one hand, the EU‘s definition of  national security as the sole 
responsibility of  individual Members also undermines the organization‘s attempt to create common 
security. This reduces the power of  its adapted institutions and creates obstacles to aligning military 
and civilian capabilities as well as in creating a competitively viable European industrial defense base. 
On the other hand, the Treaty explicitly provides possibilities to delegate specific defense policy 
tasks and functions to a group of  states. This mitigates the risks of  internal issues for the conduct 
of  CSDP and can lead to multinational cooperation between willing and more capable EU Member 
States. In view of  capability development and a strategic partnership with NATO, this can only be 
appreciated. 
 
The New HR and the EEAS as ―Foreign Ministry‖ of  the EU 
The most prominent and probably most important institutional amendments by the Lisbon Treaty 
are the ―new‖ HR and the introduction of  a diplomatic service for the Union. The office of  the HR 
was clearly strengthened and can – in tandem with the EEAS – function as a ―transmission belt for 
national foreign policy goals, which the smaller member states in particular stand to profit from,‖ 
while the EEAS could benefit from the nations‘ experiences, networks, and traditions.44 Both the 
HR and the EEAS as a single structure have great potential to bring external actions and foreign 
policies of  the EU together. Due to the diversity of  national interests of  its Members, this will 
probably not lead to a unified face in foreign policy for the Union in the intermediate term. 
However, by merging formerly divided responsibilities and fragmented competencies, the HR will 
ensure much more consistency and coherence within the EU regarding foreign policy and will have 
the formal right to initiate proposals regarding CSDP. 
Of  critical importance is the HR‘s central role between the European Commission, the Council, the 
European Council, and the EDA. These links provide the HR the possibility of  exercising CSDP 
more consistently and coherently – from initiating political objectives down to promoting 
multinational cooperation in capability development. The EEAS, directly supporting the HR, will 
facilitate its work and further consolidate the ties to the main decision making bodies of  the EU. 
With this, the HR and EEAS can significantly affect and effectively conduct CSDP within the 
framework of  the other EU institutions. 
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In view of  a complementary relationship with NATO, the HR and the EEAS are likely to play a 
significant role as well. Unifying responsibilities in the two offices will contribute significantly to 
more coherence and transparency in all fields of  CSDP. Thus, the modifications are likely to have a 
positive effect creating greater transparency and establishing closer cooperation between both 
organizations – two of  NATO Members‘ main goals in CSDP. However, to what extent the new 
Foreign Minister of  the EU will actually shape CSDP will depend mainly on the personalities 
exercising the adapted post. In this regard, the ―grotesque dispute over personnel‖45 in appointing 
the first HR for the EU dampens hope that the Member States fully recognize the importance and 
the chances the HR and the EEAS create for the EU and NATO. 
 
Integrating and Streamlining Civilian Crisis Management Planning 
With the introduction of  CMPD, the EU reduces the fragmentation of  civilian-military crisis 
management planning capacities at the political level, provides a more coherent and efficient 
capability for the HR and the EEAS to exercise their responsibilities, and institutionalizes the 
comprehensive approach to strategic level planning. The creation of  CMPD is a result of  the 
suboptimal civil-military planning cell in the European Union Military Staff, which failed to ―act as a 
‗system integrator‘ that would unify the civilian and the military strand of  [CSDP].‖46 In conjunction 
with the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, CMPD is the attempt to increase effectiveness, 
coherence, and efficiency of  planning and execution procedures for civilian crisis management 
operations and to establish a civilian counterpart to the strategic military chain of  command within 
CSDP. 
Streamlining its civilian crisis management institutions enables the EU to apply a comprehensive 
approach at the strategic level and will contribute to more efficiency and coherence in CSDP. This 
capability has the potential to benefit a complementary relationship between NATO and the EU, if  
both organizations link their strategic planning capabilities. Yet again, this calls for institutionalized 
coordination and cooperation between both organizations. 
 
Berlin Plus as a Framework for a Successful Comprehensive Approach? 
At this point, it does make sense to briefly reflect on the EU‘s existing procedures to apply its means 
in a comprehensive approach as introduced earlier. As shown, the provisions of  the Lisbon Treaty 
integrate permanent military and civilian planning capabilities on the strategic level of  CSDP. 
However, the EU does not possess the capabilities to actually plan and lead a military operation on 
the highest military level. For its civilian operations, the Union can rely on ad hoc structures to form 
an Operational and Force Headquarters. However, to utilize a comprehensive approach in crisis 
management, the EU relies on the Berlin Plus agreements for operating military command 
structures.  
The Lisbon Treaty does not provide specific provisions for accessing non-inherent capabilities and 
using them in a comprehensive approach in crisis management operations. The EU still depends on 
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Berlin Plus, which has been successfully utilized in the past. However, cooperation under Berlin Plus 
is continuously overshadowed by the Turkey-Cyprus-Greece conflict and their competing national 
interests and objects  on how to shape CSDP. Thus, a strategic and complementary relationship 
between NATO and the EU is unachievable under Berlin Plus. 
 
The effects of  the Lisbon Treaty on Capability Development 
Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defense for a More Flexible and Capable CSDP 
The Lisbon Treaty's most important, innovative, and ambitious amendment is certainly the 
introduction of  PSCD as a tool to deepen the cooperation of  its Member States in various areas of  
CSDP.  PSCD seems indeed to be the Union‘s solution for this issue.47 Key provisions of  the PSCD 
are the prerequisites it demands of  a nation to join, as well as the measures to assess progress and 
the ability to suspend a participating country that fails to meet these standards. Although initially 
high standards were set, proposed prerequisites to join a PSCD were soon lowered on behalf  of  
smaller countries during the Treaty text negotiations, which virtually eliminated any discriminator to 
join.48 However, this will not likely have any serious consequence, because PSCD must be inclusive 
in order to avoid a division of  the EU concerning defense cooperation, and to increase political 
coherence in security matters. On the other hand, too many participants would pose the risk of  
slowing down the pace of  planning and executing a PSCD. Thus, only the right balance of  a critical 
mass of  member states will make PSCD an effective tool.49 
EDA will have to play a major role in creating future concrete criteria to assess the progress of  a 
PSCD.  Assessment criteria will also have to include proposals on how to suspend a country from 
cooperation. The Lisbon Treaty does provide the theoretical conditions to do this; whether the EU 
will be able to achieve this in practice remains uncertain. This also applies to the question of  
whether a PSCD can be established if  it violates particular interests of  another EU Member State.50 
PSCD does have the potential to generate a top-down approach in CSDP and to accelerate 
capability development for the Union. However, it is not the ―silver bullet‖ for solving the EU‘s 
problems.51 
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The introduction of  PSCD clearly favors NATO Members‘ interests in achieving higher efficiency 
in capability development and thus promotes a complementary relationship between both 
organizations. The Protocol explicitly aims at increasing the deployability of  European forces and at 
reducing military capability redundancies among EU countries. With this aim, the Lisbon Treaty 
implements a concept that could open new possibilities in strategic NATO-EU cooperation, 
particularly in armament cooperation. 
 
EDA as an Official Organization of  the EU 
Introducing EDA as an official organization of  the EU has the potential to be the most significant 
change resulting from the Lisbon Treaty. Although at first glance unimposing, associating the EDA 
with the HR and integrating it in CSDP will offer a significant number of  possibilities in three 
interacting areas: harmonizing, specializing and pooling of  European military forces, overcoming the 
fragmented European defense market, and the proactive framing of  multinational armament 
cooperation. 
In the first area, the range of  possibilities is certainly immense but at the same time hindered by the 
most significant political obstacles. Abandoning certain military capabilities to focus on niche 
capabilities and specialization does increase political interdependence among collaborating nations 
and can lead – in the worst case – to an inability to employ viable military force. This narrows the 
scope of  cooperation mainly to pooling of  non-expeditionary forces, the alignment of  military 
doctrine and concepts, and the standardization of  equipment and logistics. A first positive example 
of  successful harmonization and pooling of  capabilities is the European Air Transportation 
Command. With, continuously decreasing military budgets and constant high political ambitions, 
such harmonization, specialization, and pooling of  military forces are likely to increase.52 At the 
strategic level, EDA will play a central role in this regard. 
In the second and third areas, EDA has a great chance of  accomplishing short-term objectives, 
although significant political obstacles exist in these areas as well. The major reason for the 
increasing capability gap between European and US forces lies in the relatively high costs European 
countries have to bear for research, experimentation, and development, and not primarily in a lack 
of  budgets and spending.53 The disproportional costs result from highly fragmented national defense 
programs, which also diminish military interoperability and further consolidate the already 
fragmented industrial base for defense equipment in Europe.54 Here, the primary political obstacles 
are various degrees of  government-industry relations among EU countries and unresolved questions 
of  the ownership of  intellectual property rights of  developed technology.55 With a high redundancy 
of  industrial skills on the national level, countries seek to run their own research and development 
programs. Elevated to Treaty level and under the direct lead of  the HR, the EDA is in the right 
position to address those issues and to overcome protectionism among member states‘ defense 
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markets.56 As such, the EDA will probably perform first the management and coordination tasks. 
Linked by the HR to the EU‘s main decision bodies, EDA can play a central role initiating such 
cooperation and utilizing PSCD as a tool to facilitate progress and to overcome political obstacles. 
EDA is likely to play a crucial role in the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, 
particularly in the field of  capability development. Embedding EDA in CSDP under the HR, the 
EU has taken significant steps clearly directed towards a more capable and deployable European 
force. More harmonized, specialized and pooled European military forces, a competitive defense 
market, and more multinational cooperation will most certainly lead to an increase of  deployable 
military capabilities in Europe. Furthermore, EDA provides NATO with a single point of  contact to 
discuss and to align military capability development programs. This is in the Alliance Members‘ best 
interests. However, limiting EDA to EU‘s Members does exclude non-EU countries, such as Turkey, 
from participation. With a view on the Cyprus conflict, this appears counterproductive to efforts to 
resolve strategic issues between NATO and the EU. 
 
Conclusion 
In implementing the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is undertaking the necessary steps to strengthen CSDP. 
The treaty aligns and harmonizes the institutions and procedures in CSDP and provides a fertile 
framework for future military capability development. That does not mean that the Treaty resolves 
every shortcoming in CSDP and that all provisions are directed towards a complementary 
relationship with NATO. This would be beyond rational expectations.  
On the strategic level, the main political obstacle for a true strategic partnership between NATO and 
the EU remains the unresolved Turkey-Greece-Cyprus conflict. The resulting strategic stalemate 
denies the EU the ability to develop a more coherent CSDP, prevents effective NATO-EU 
cooperation, and hampers military capability development through EDA. Furthermore, the 
strengthening of  the intergovernmental character of  CSDP dampens the hopes for the development 
of  an inherent strategic culture, which would allow the EU to operationalize the EU Security 
Strategy into a civil-military strategy for CSDP. The limited political coherence yet denies the EU 
developing a strategic frame that explains the rationale behind the Lisbon Treaty‘s amendments and 
raises questions of  how integration in foreign relations and the defense sector should go forward. 
Despite those limitations, one must acknowledge that Lisbon Treaty‘s mutual defense clause and the 
extended Petersberg Tasks do not aim at replacing the Alliance‘s role and have rather a high potential 
to promote a strategic partnership between NATO and the EU through its significantly adapted 
institutional structures. The most significant effects of  the Treaty are its provisions regarding the 
EU‘s institutions that deal with CSDP. These provisions will enable the Union to establish a strategic 
partnership with NATO. However, the changes also have the potential to reinforce already existing 
political obstacles within the EU as well as the NATO-EU relationship. First, by introducing the 
European Council as an official institution the EU strengthens the intergovernmental character of  
CSDP and provides an anchor for its Members to oppose further integration as well as block 
important decisions. This decreases the chances for establishing a supranational CSDP and 
continues to limit EU‘s capabilities to the least common denominator. However, by introducing the 
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HR, the EEAS, the CMPD, and the PSCD, the EU is undertaking innovative and ambitious steps to 
increase transparency, coherence, and efficiency of  CSDP. The HR and the EEAS have the potential 
to be the driving forces in CSDP and to strengthen the interconnection with NATO towards a 
complementary partnership.  
The introduction of  the PSCD provides the EU an appropriate tool to overcome member state 
dissention over CSDP and clearly facilitates military capability development through multinational 
cooperation of  those Members who are willing and capable to do so. Streamlined strategic planning, 
operational capability, and the EU‘s ability to apply a comprehensive approach in strategic crisis 
management planning, offer opportunities for future cooperation with NATO. All these changes are 
in the best interests of  NATO and EU Members, if  the EU takes appropriate steps to link its 
institutions, procedures, and planning capabilities to NATO. It will require significant political effort 
of  major state players of  both organizations to mitigate the inertia caused by the unresolved Turkey-
Greece-Cyprus conflict. 
With regard to military capability development, the Treaty introduces EDA as an official institution 
and embeds the Agency in CSDP appropriately. The agency has the potential of  being a cornerstone 
in future NATO-EU relations and cooperation between both organizations in capability 
development. This is in the best interests of  NATO Members, particularly the US. However, limiting 
EDA for EU Member States institutionalizes existing political issues and hampers progress. Overall, 
the Lisbon Treaty creates the necessary institutional prerequisites for successful capability 
development among EU Member States and promotes a complementary relationship between 
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